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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction 
over appeals from a number of administrative bodies, as well as subject-
specific appeals from all U.S. district courts.1 Two significant areas of 
appeal from district courts are patent law and trade law.2 The Federal 
Circuit consists of twelve judges, whom the President appoints and the 
Senate confirms to lifetime terms. In this Article of the Federal Circuit 
Symposium issue, I will be examining key cases the Federal Circuit heard 
 
 * Ph.D., George Mason University; J.D., M.A., American University; B.A., Lock Haven 
University. Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Irvin Gross Research Fellow at 
Temple University. Professor Fandl is also the former Chief of Staff for International 
Trade and Intellectual Property at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
International Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Center. The author would like 
to thank the editorial staff at the American University Law Review for their outstanding 
work on this piece. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012). 
 2. § 1295(a)(4)–(7). 
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on appeal from the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). These cases 
typically involve matters of antidumping and countervailing duty 
(AD/CVD) law, customs classification, and the origin of imported goods. 
I will begin with an examination of classification cases. 
I.    CLASSIFICATION 
A key element in international trade is the identification of goods 
being imported. Without the ability to identify a good, customs officers 
could not properly classify a good, determine whether any restrictions 
apply to it, and decide what tariff, if any, they should apply. The latter 
issue is of great significance to importers, who generally want to avoid 
excessive tariffs on certain goods. 
Consider the famous 2005 case, Conair Corp. v. United States,3 which 
involved the import of simulated desktop waterfalls, also known as 
“Serenity Ponds.”4 The importer, Conair, classified these devices as 
“[p]umps for liquids,”5 which carried a 0% tariff rate. Upon review, 
Customs decided that the devices should be classified as “[o]ther 
articles of plastics,”6 which carried a tariff rate of 5.3%. The central 
question in the case was: what are these devices? The CIT ultimately 
decided that because the water pump was the essential element that 
made these plastic devices transform into “Serenity Ponds,” they 
should be classified as water pumps.7 The decision likely saved Conair 
millions of dollars in potential tariffs. 
Classification in the United States is based upon the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule, which is maintained by the World Customs 
Organization and to which more than 170 members abide. This 
schedule provides classifications for nearly every good in existence, 
though defining the nature of a particular good is often a complex 
process that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) performs 
upon the entry of the imported goods. Likewise, importers are no 
strangers to this process and can often use “tariff engineering” to avert 
certain tariffs. For instance, while the import of garlic powder carries 
a high tariff, blending that powder with 1% onion powder converts the 
good into a “vegetable blend,” subjecting it to a lower tariff. 
 
 3. 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 888 (2005). 
 4. Id. at 888–89. 
 5. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(2020), USITC Pub. 5011, subheading 8413.70.2004 (Jan. 2020). 
 6. Id. at subheading 3926.40.00. 
 7. Conair Corp., 29 Ct. Int’l Trade at 899. 
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This Article’s first section will highlight some of the key classification 
cases that were appealed to Federal Circuit and in the process, explain 
some key classification rules that the Federal Circuit helped to clarify 
this term. We begin with a case involving the nature of doorknobs. 
Doorknobs are useful tools to allow entry into a home. But they are also 
useful to help us understand the classification of goods in the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). These seemingly 
straightforward pieces of hardware were the subject of Home Depot v. United 
States,8 which the Federal Circuit decided in February 2019.9 
The Home Depot case was a challenge to CBP’s classification of 
imported doorknobs with integral locks. CBP initially classified these 
products as locks under heading 8301 of the HTSUS, carrying a tariff 
of 5.7% ad valorem.10 Home Depot argued that the locks should have 
been classified as metal fittings for doors under heading 8302 of the 
HTSUS, carrying a tariff of 3.9% ad valorem.11 
Heading 8301, in relevant part, reads as follows: “Door locks, locksets 
and other locks suitable for use with interior or exterior doors (except 
garage, overhead or sliding doors).”12 
Heading 8302, in relevant part, reads as follows: 
Base metal mountings, fittings and similar articles suitable for 
furniture, doors, staircases, windows, blinds, coachwork, saddlery, 
trunks, chests, caskets or the like; base metal hat racks, hat-pegs, 
brackets and similar fixtures; castors with mountings of base metal; 
automatic door closers of base metal; and base metal parts thereof: 
[o]ther mountings, fittings and similar articles, and parts thereof . . . 
[o]f iron or steel, of aluminum or of zinc . . . [s]uitable for interior 
and exterior doors (except garage, overhead or sliding doors).13 
Though both headings seem to be broad enough to include the 
subject merchandise, the question for the Federal Circuit was how to 
determine which heading was most appropriate. In cases like these, the 
Federal Circuit (and CBP) turns to the General Rules of Interpretation 
(GRI), which provide guidance in understanding the HTSUS. 
The CIT agreed with CBP’s classification determination, finding that 
heading 8301 wholly described the subject doorknobs. The CIT found 
that heading 8302 also describes the goods, but that heading 8301 does 
 
 8. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 915 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 9. Id. at 1376. 
 10. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1308 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2017), vacated, 915 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 11. Id. at 1308. 
 12. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 8301.40.6030. 
 13. Id. at subheading 8302.41.60. 
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so more completely. Whereas heading 8302 would include doorknobs, 
the subject merchandise was in fact locksets with keyed entry systems, 
making them a more complex product better described by heading 
8301.14 The Federal Circuit disagreed. 
The GRIs help determine proper HTSUS headings and subheadings 
to resolve classification disputes. The GRIs have four basic rules: 
1. GRI 1 controls imported articles that a single classification 
heading or subheading describes.15 
2. GRI 2(a) explains that the any heading covering a complete 
article will also cover an incomplete or unfinished article, as long as 
the unfinished article has the “essential character” of the complete 
article.16 GRI 2(a) explains that the any heading covering a complete 
article will also cover an incomplete or unfinished article, as long as 
the unfinished article has the “essential character” of the complete 
article.17 GRI 2(b) simply states that relevant parties should classify 
imported articles comprised of multiple materials or substances 
according to the tripartite GRI 3, which governs goods within the scope 
of multiple materials or substances according to the tripartite GRI 3, 
which governs goods within the scope of multiple headings.18 
3. GRI 3(a) instructs those classifying goods that fall under 
multiple headings to defer to the most specific description.19 However, 
when multiple headings refer to only part of the materials and 
substances contained in a composite good, those headings are equally 
specific relative to that good.20 If 3(a) does not apply to a given composite 
good, 3(b) directs parties to classify that good as if the composite only 
contained the material or component that gives the composite its 
essential character.21 When neither 3(a) nor 3(b) applies to a composite 
good, 3(c) instructs parties to classify the good under the heading that 
occurs last numerically among equally applicable headings.22 
 
 14. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Home Depot, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1314) (“A 
lock, the court added, ‘is a multi-component device, of which one component is a 
lever. In some types of locks, the lever is a door knob.’”). 
 15. CamelBak Prods., L.L.C. v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 16. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 2(a). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 2(b). 
 19. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1380. 
 20. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 3(a). 
 21. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 3(b). 
 22. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 3(c). 
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4. Per GRI 4, relevant parties should classify goods that do not fall 
within the scope of the preceding rules under the heading 
corresponding to the most similar goods.23 
Applying the GRI, the Federal Circuit found that neither heading 
captured the whole product appropriately.24 Heading 8301 describes 
door locks, whereas heading 8302 describes doorknobs.25 As the 
subject merchandise is both a doorknob and a door lock, GRI 1 
stipulates that neither heading is dispositive in the classification 
process because both headings only describe part of the good.26 
Having concluded that neither heading is dispositive due to lack of 
completeness, the Federal Circuit moved on to consider GRI 2, which 
focuses instead on the essential character of the good. “Essential 
character” typically refers to the principal use of the product—the reason 
consumers might demand it, for instance.27 In the 2005 case, Conair v. 
United States, the subject merchandise was a desktop waterfall, and the 
classification dispute was whether the water pump that moved water 
through the device or the plastic parts that comprised the actual waterfall 
constituted the waterfall’s essential character.28 In that case, the element 
that determined the essential character was the water pump, without 
which the waterfall would be nothing more than a piece of plastic.29 
The Federal Circuit concluded in the Home Depot case that GRI 3(b) 
was the appropriate rule for classifying the imported locksets there.30 
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the CIT to determine the 
essential character of the locksets.31 
In the second classification case during the Federal Circuit’s last 
term, the court again relied upon the GRIs to uphold a lower court 
decision classifying fiberoptic telecommunication devices. ADC 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. United States32 involved a challenge to CBP’s 
classification of such equipment under HTSUS heading 9013 (“other 
 
 23. Id. General Rules of Interpretation 4. 
 24. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1380. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1378–80; see U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of 
Interpretation 1. 
 27. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1300 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2012); Structural Indus., Inc. v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2005); Conair Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 888, 895 (2005). 
 28. Conair Corp., 29 Ct. Int’l Trade at 895–96 (2005). 
 29. Id. at 896–97. 
 30. Home Depot, 915 F.3d at 1380. 
 31. Id. at 1381. 
 32. 916 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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optical appliances and instruments, not specified or included 
elsewhere in this chapter”).33 The equipment in question includes 
connectors on the ends of fiberoptic cables that allow installation 
without the need to splice the cable. 
ADC argued that the imported fiberoptic modules should have been 
classified under heading 8517 (“other apparatus for the transmission 
or reception of voice, images or other data, including apparatus for 
communication in a wired or wireless network (such as a local or wide 
area network)”), which bears no duty.34 The original classification 
includes a duty rate of 4.5% ad valorem.35 The key question in this case 
was whether the modules are prima facie classifiable under the 
subheading CBP relied on, in which case there would be no need to 
consider a more specific classification. 
The GRIs are used when more than one heading could potentially 
describe subject imports. A court will apply the GRIs in chronological 
order, “meaning that subsequent rules are inapplicable if a preceding 
rule provides proper classification.”36 The first GRI states that 
“classification shall be determined according to the terms of the 
headings and any relative section or chapter notes.”37 These headings 
are examined without regard to the subheadings therein.38 
Here, the Federal Circuit turned to technical and general 
dictionaries to aid in defining the meaning of optical devices. The 
Federal Circuit found that the 9013 heading simply required that the 
subject merchandise be primarily used for transmitting data through 
the use of light.39 The CIT agreed with ADC that the subject 
merchandise could also be classified under heading 8517; however, 
that heading differentiates products on the basis of physical 
characteristics rather than the use of the cables (i.e., the transmission 
of data).40 Also, as heading 8517 specifically excludes any product 
classified by heading 9013, and as the Federal Circuit confirmed that 
the modules should be classified under heading 9013, the modules 
could not fall within heading 8517.41 
 
 33. Id. at 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2019); U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 
subheading 9013. 
 34. ADC Telecomm., 916 F.3d 1013 at 1015. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 845 F.3d 1158, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 37. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 1. 
 38. See R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 39. See ADC Telecomm., 916 F.3d at 1019, 1021. 
 40. Id. at 1021. 
 41. Id. at 1022–23. 
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Finally, the Federal Circuit applied GRI 6, which requires that, once 
a good has been classified under a particular heading, the first four 
GRIs would be reapplied to determine the appropriate subheading 
under that heading.42 Applying that rule of interpretation, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the subject merchandise did not fall within any 
of the defined subheadings.43 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
classified the goods in the “other” category.44 
Most classification cases involve disputes over very small details 
within target goods. For example, in Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. United 
States,45 the Federal Circuit determined whether the target imports 
were pliers or wrenches.46 The CBP sought to classify the goods as 
wrenches under heading 8204.12.00, which carries a 9% duty, whereas 
the importer sought to classify the goods as pliers under 8203.20.60, 
which carries a duty of $0.12 per dozen plus 5.5%.47 
The unique contribution of this case during the 2019 term is the 
discussion of when to apply an eo nomine interpretation and when to 
limit a definition by use. When applying eo nominee interpretation, a 
term is considered to include all possible definitions and forms and is 
not limited by use.48 When limiting a definition by use, a term can be 
defined by how the good is used in practice.49 The Federal Circuit 
reiterates that “a use limitation should not be read into an eo nomine 
provision unless the name itself inherently suggests a type of use.”50 
In the Irwin case, CBP attempted to define the term “wrench” as eo 
nomine, but defined “pliers” by their use, which it found to be “pincers 
with two handles and jaws adapted for manipulating small objects or 
for bending and shaping wire, sometimes including a wire cutter, and 
whose grasp is dependent upon maintaining continuous hand 
pressure.”51 CBP’s chosen dictionary definition for “wrench,” on the 
 
 42. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, General Rules of Interpretation 6. Note 
that GRIs I–IV apply in order until one of the rules fits the particular situation. GRIs V 
and VI apply independently as needed; see, e.g., Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 
140 F.3d 1437, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 43. ADC Telecomm., 916, F.3d at 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 44. Id.; see U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 9013.80.9000. 
 45. Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. United States, 920 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 46. Id. at 1357–58. 
 47. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 8203.20.6030. 
 48. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co. v. United States, 55 C.C.P.A. 69, 75 (1968)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 920 F.3d at 1358–59. 
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other hand, referred to tools “used for holding, twisting, or turning a 
bolt, nut, screwhead, pipe or other object.”52 With these definitions in 
hand, CBP classified Irwin’s goods, which included “straight jaw 
locking pliers, large jaw locking pliers, curved jaw locking pliers with 
and without wire cutters, and long nose locking pliers with wire 
cutters,” as wrenches.53 CBP went on to state that “locking tools should 
not be included in the definition of pliers because the primary purpose 
of a locking mechanism is to permit the maximum application of torque, 
which is the function of a wrench.”54 
Irwin countered CBP’s use-based definition of “wrenches” and 
argued that they should be defined eo nomine. Irwin made the point 
that if the CIT accepted CBP’s definition, the CIT would have to 
classify a crowbar as a wrench since the use of a crowbar is “to permit 
the maximum application of torque.”55 The CIT agreed with Irwin and 
applied dictionary definitions to both goods.56 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that the term “wrench” is an eo 
nomine term not limited by use.57 The Federal Circuit noted that some 
wrenches and pliers are created for specific purposes; however, these 
exceptions are not a reasonable basis to limit the definition of the object 
itself to those specified uses.58 Applying these eo nomine definitions, the 
Federal Circuit agreed that the target goods were properly classified as 
pliers.59 As the next case indicates, these ambiguous classification 
distinctions can result in significant unexpected expenses for companies. 
Christmas became a little more costly for Rubie’s Costume Company 
thanks to the Federal Circuit’s decision on Santa costumes.60 This case, 
Rubies Costume Co. v. United States,61 addressed the question of what 
makes a costume a festive article rather than fancy dress of textile 
material. The subject good was a nine-piece Santa suit, consisting of 
jacket, pants, hat, and all of the accoutrements typical of the 
character.62 The items were classified in different subheadings across 
chapters 61 and 62, which cover fancy dress and carry higher duty 
 
 52. Id. at 1358. 
 53. Id. at 1357. 
 54. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Id. at 1358–59. 
 56. Id. at 1358. 
 57. Id. at 1361. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1360. 
 60. Rubies Costume Co. v. United States, 922 F.3d 1337, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 61. 922 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 62. Id. at 1340. 
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rates.63 Rubie’s argued that the goods should enter duty-free as festive 
articles under chapter 95.64 
This case was not the first time that the Federal Circuit addressed 
the definition of costumes. Rubie’s was party to a 2003 Federal Circuit 
decision addressing the importation and classification of Halloween 
costumes.65 In that case, Rubie’s asserted that the costumes should be 
classified as festive articles under chapter 95; however, the court pointed 
out that Note 1(e) to that chapter excludes “fancy dress, of textiles of 
chapter 61 or 62,” from chapter 95.66 The Federal Circuit in that case 
defined “fancy dress” to include costumes that are wearable as apparel.67 
Following the first Rubies Costume Co. v. United States68 decision in 
2003, CBP went on to issue an Informed Compliance Publication 
(ICP), which distinguished flimsy, nondurable costumes that would 
qualify for classification under chapter 95 from well-made, normal 
wearing apparel that would qualify for classification under chapters 61 
and 62.69 CBP applied this guidance to the Santa suit in the more recent 
case and determined that the high-quality manufacture of the suit, 
including the “woven satin fabric lining” of the jacket that is suitable for 
dry cleaning and multiple uses, the acrylic and polyester pants with 
hemmed pockets, the 100% polyester knit gloves, and so forth, excluded 
the Santa suit from chapter 95 because it qualified as “fancy dress.”70 
The CIT agreed with the interpretation by CBP and denied Rubie’s 
motion for summary judgment.71 The Federal Circuit likewise agreed 
and clarified that “fancy dress” is not limited to apparel that one would 
wear on a regular basis, but rather that it could include a well-made 
costume that one could wear multiple times due to its quality 
construction.72 The CIT correctly called these costumes “well-made” and 
 
 63. Id. at 1341. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Rubies Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 66. Id. at 1352, 1356. 
 67. Rubies Costume Co., 922 F.3d at 1345. 
 68. 337 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 69. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT 
EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: CLASSIFICATION OF 
TEXTILE COSTUMES UNDER THE HTSUS 10 (2008), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/icp077_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFD7-M6K6]. 
 70. Rubies Costume Co., 922 F.3d at 1345. 
 71. Id. at 1341. 
 72. Id. at 1345. 
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able to survive several holiday seasons, thereby relieving the costumes of 
their festive article status and turning them into fancy dress.73 
The Federal Circuit had an opportunity to apply its reasoning from 
Rubies right away in a case dealing with sausage casings imported from 
Germany.74 In Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States,75 the importer sought to 
classify its casings, which consist of textile covering coated with a layer 
of plastic on one side, as plastics under chapter 39 of the HTSUS, 
which carry a duty rate of 3.1%.76 CBP chose to classify them as “made-
up textiles” under chapter 63 with a duty rate of 7%.77 
The key issue in Kalle was how to define the term “completely 
embedded” in plastics as it is used in chapter 59 of the HTSUS. The 
Federal Circuit explained that the HTSUS does not allow a good to be 
classifiable under two separate headings when there are mutually 
exclusive rules in those headings.78 In this case, the rules are found in 
chapter 39 and section XI, which encompasses chapters 59 and 63. 
Note 1(h) of section XI stipulates that fabrics that are “impregnated, 
coated, covered or laminated with plastics” are covered by chapter 39 
and are excluded from section XI.79 Note 2(p) of chapter 39 excludes 
textile goods from section XI from chapter 39.80 In Kalle, the Federal 
Circuit addressed whether the subject imports were “completely 
embedded” in plastics, as “completely embedded” is used under 
chapter 59 of the HTSUS. 
The Federal Circuit applied the common definition of “completely 
embedded” and found that the plastic would have to be “set or fix[ed] 
firmly in a surrounding mass.”81 The Federal Circuit concluded that 
“for a textile to be completely embedded in plastic, it must be entirely 
firmly fixed in the plastic.”82 Following the logic of Rubies, the Federal 
Circuit reasoned that the exclusionary rules must be read in context to 
understand why they were included in the HTSUS in the first place.83 
 
 73. Id. at 1345–46. 
 74. Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States, 923 F.3d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam). 
 75. 923 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 76. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 3917.39.0050. 
 77. Id. at subheading 6307.90.98. 
 78. Kalle USA, 923 F.3d at 994. 
 79. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, § XI n.1(h). 
 80. Id. at ch. 39 n.2(p). 
 81. Kalle USA, 923 F.3d at 995 (quoting Embedded, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY, 442–43 (3d coll. ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Id. (quoting Kalle USA, Inc. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1333 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2017)). 
 83. Id. at 996. 
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Here, the court suggested that the drafters wanted to make a 
distinction between fabrics that are impregnated with plastic and those 
that are completely embedded in plastics.84 While this does not mean 
that the fabric must have plastic on all sides, it does have to be fixed in 
a surrounding mass of plastic.85 
Continuing with the line of discussion about eo nomine versus use 
provisions in the HTSUS, the Federal Circuit used a single-entry case 
brought by Ford Motor Company to explain when use can be 
considered even in an eo nomine term.86 In Ford Motor Co. v. United 
States,87 Ford imported a van suitable for either passengers or cargo, 
depending on the interior layout of the van.88 When defined as a cargo 
van, the vehicle is subject to a 25% tariff.89 As a passenger van, the tariff 
would be only 2.5%.90 
The subject vehicles were imported with a second row of seats, 
making them both appropriate for passengers and, in the opinion of the 
CIT, classifiable as passenger vans.91 However, after importation but 
before leaving the port, Ford removed the rear seats and plugged the 
holes to make the vans suitable for cargo.92 The actual or intended use 
would normally be considered for HTSUS terms that are not eo nomine. 
Generally, “a use limitation should not be read into an eo nomine 
provision.”93 However, the Federal Circuit notes that when the definition 
itself suggests a “type of use,” the usage should not be ignored.94 
The CIT determined that the HTSUS definition of the subject 
vehicles was eo nomine; thus, consideration of the use of the vehicle 
was unnecessary in the CIT’s analysis.95 The Federal Circuit provided 
examples of fact patterns that would require a court to look beyond 
the definition itself and examine the use of the good. For instance, for 
a handbag to be classified as a “vanity case,” its primary use would have 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 926 F.3d 741, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 87. 926 F.3d 741 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 88. See generally id. at 745–47 (explaining how Ford converted the passenger vans 
into cargo vans after importation). 
 89. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at subheading 8704.31.00. 
 90. Id. at subheading 8703.23.01. 
 91. Ford Motor Co., 926 F.3d at 748. 
 92. Id. at 747. 
 93. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 94. Id.; see also GRK Can., Ltd. v. United States, 761 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (reaffirming this approach). 
 95. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1332 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2017), rev’d, 926 F.3d 741 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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to be to hold cosmetics.96 Similarly, for the definition of “other wood 
screws” to apply, the primary use would have to be to fasten wood.97 
Referencing the precedent set in Marubeni America Corp. v. United 
States,98 the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT and found that when use 
is implied in an eo nomine term, the actual or intended use can be 
considered when classifying the goods.99 
II.    ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES 
One of the most active areas of defensive trade law in the United States 
is the area of antidumping and countervailing duties. Both of these 
defenses to imports arose in the Tariff Act of 1930, which specifies that the 
United States may impose duties on imports to “provide relief from market 
distortions caused by foreign producers who sell their merchandise in the 
United States for less than fair market value” (antidumping) or “to address 
government subsidies to foreign producers” (countervailing duties).100 
Each of these defenses must be justified by an investigation which, today, is 
conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), an 
independent body that works with the Department of Commerce 
(Commerce) to assess material injury. 
To determine whether an exporter is dumping a product in the 
United States, Commerce first conducts its own investigation to assess 
whether an imported good is being sold in the United States below fair 
market value and, if so, by how much (i.e., the dumping margin). 
Simultaneously, the USITC assesses: 
(1) whether there is a “reasonable indication” that an industry is 
materially injured or is threatened with material injury, or (2) 
whether the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, by 
reason of imports under investigation by the Department of 
Commerce that are allegedly sold at less than fair value in the United 
States or subsidized.101 
To counter dumping, the United States conducts investigations to 
assess whether and to what extent an exporter is dumping an imported 
 
 96. Ford Motor Co., 926 F.3d at 751 (citing Len-Ron Mfg. Co. v. United States, 334 
F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 97. Id. (citing GRK, 761 F.3d at 1359). 
 98. 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 99. See id. at 534–35 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Ford Motor Co., 926 F.3d at 754 (“The 
subject merchandise is not principally designed for the transport of persons.”). 
 100. Bell Supply Co. v. United States, 888 F.3d 1222, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(referring to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2012)). 
 101. Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/usad.htm [https://perma.cc/5 PFL-PL4L]. 
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product and, where appropriate, levy an additional duty on that imported 
good to offset the cost differential between the good’s fair market value 
and its sales price. According to § 1673 in Title 19 of the U.S. Code, any 
imported good sold or likely to be sold on “the United States [market] at 
less than its fair value” may qualify for an antidumping duty.102 
A. Calculating the Dumping Margin 
The dumping margin for subject merchandise is calculated by 
subtracting the price of the imported good in the export market from the 
price of the good in the United States—the “export price.”103 The process 
for calculating the dumping margin is outlined in § 1673 of the 
Countervailing and Antidumping duties under Title 19 of the U.S. 
Code,104 which stipulates the following steps: 
1. Commerce determines the “export price” (the price paid by the 
first unaffiliated buyer in the United States) of the target merchandise;105 
2. Commerce determines the “normal value” (the price sold in the 
exporting market) of the target merchandise;106 
3. If the export price is lower than the normal value, Commerce sets 
the duty rate at the difference between the two prices;107 
4. Finally, Commerce establishes the “dumping margin” by using the 
weighted average of all targeted exporters.108 
Despite this relatively straightforward-sounding process, in practice, the 
calculation is much more complicated. The export price is determined in 
one of two ways. First, it may reflect the price at which the subject 
merchandise is sold or the price at which it is agreed to be sold prior to 
importation by the foreign producer to an unaffiliated buyer in or 
exporter to the United States.109 This is known as the “export price.” 
However, if the first sale is not to an unaffiliated buyer or exporter, 
Commerce must determine the “constructed export price.”110 This 
second method takes the price of the first sale to the affiliated buyer 
or exporter and adjusts it based upon a number of specified criteria. 
 
 102. § 1673. 
 103. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 104. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. 
 105. § 1677a(a). 
 106. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 107. § 1673. 
 108. § 1677(35). 
 109. § 1677a(a). 
 110. § 1677a(b). 
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Among the criteria by which the constructed export price is adjusted 
are expenses incurred by the producer or exporter. These expenses 
include sales commissions, warranties and credit expenses, selling 
expenses the seller pays on behalf of the purchaser, costs related to 
further manufacture in the United States, and associated profit.111 
Commerce deducts these expenses from the sales price, thus 
increasing the dumping margin. 
As discussed above, the dumping margin is calculated by subtracting 
the export price or the constructed export price from the “normal 
value,” which is the price the good is sold for in the exporting 
market.112 The normal value is determined by calculating the sale price 
for the product in the exporting country where it is first sold (or 
offered for sale) for consumption within that country. This valuation 
method assumes the supply, channel of trade, and volume of trade is 
consistent with those of the importing country.113 The statute also 
specifies a number of adjustments that can offset this price.114 
After investigating power transformer imports from Korea at the 
request of domestic producers, including ABB Inc., Commerce 
imposed an antidumping duty on those imports in 2012.115 Hyundai 
was a mandatory respondent in that investigation. Hyundai’s first sales 
were to a seller affiliated with Hyundai. Accordingly, Commerce used 
the constructed export price method to determine the sales price of 
the target goods.116 
In ABB, Inc. v. United States,117 referred to as the Hyundai case, the 
main issue revolved around how to calculate a commission adjustment 
when the commission is paid on U.S. sales but not on foreign sales.118 
The Federal Circuit found that Commerce properly reduced the 
constructed export price by the amount of the U.S. sales 
commission;119 however, Hyundai contended that Commerce failed to 
adjust the normal value with a commission offset.120 The Federal 
 
 111. § 1677a(d)(1)–(3). 
 112. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 113. Id.  
 114. § 1677b(a)(6)(A)–(C). 
 115. See Large Power Transformers from the Republic of Korea: Preliminary 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final 
Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 9204, 9204 (Feb. 16, 2012). 
 116. Id. at 9207. 
 117. 920 F.3d 811 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 118. Id. at 812–13. 
 119. Id. at 817. 
 120. Id. at 815. 
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Circuit agreed with the CIT in finding Commerce’s justification for not 
providing a commission offset reasonable.121 Commerce stated that it 
only offsets a commission (i.e., reduces the normal value by that 
amount) when the seller pays those commissions in the home market 
or outside the United States.122 In the case of commissions paid only in 
the United States, Commerce reduces those amounts from the export 
price or constructed export price, as it did in this case.123 
B.   Determination of Origin 
In order to measure the difference in value from the foreign market 
to the U.S. market, Commerce must determine two things: first, it must 
classify the imports to ensure that it is valuing the correct good under 
investigation, and; second, it must determine from where the good was 
shipped—its origin.124 The origin of the good is typically determined 
by identifying the location in which it was manufactured or 
processed.125 However, in cases in which the good was pieced together 
or transformed in more than one country, Commerce typically follows 
the substantial transformation test.126 
The substantial transformation test enables Commerce to determine 
whether a good changed origin on the basis of processing in a country 
other than its first point of origin.127 If a product is manufactured in one 
country but assembled in another, that product “loses its identity and is 
transformed into a new product having a new name, character and use.”128 
This term, the Federal Circuit heard a case that dealt with an 
application of a test other than the substantial information test during 
an AD/CVD investigation.129 The case, Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United 
States,130 involved solar panels imported from China and began with a 
2011 investigation spawned by a petition from a domestic solar panel 
 
 121. Id. at 826. 
 122. Id. at 825–26. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Market Value: Certain Cold-
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Argentina, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,062, 37,065 (July 9, 1993). 
 125. See id. at 37,065. 
 126. See id. (explaining “substantial transformation” refers to the degree to which a 
product is processed or manufactured in a country to be deemed a product of that country). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Bell Supply Co. v. United States, 888 F.3d 1222, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Bestfoods v. United States, 165 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 129. Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 130. 918 F.3d 909 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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manufacturer, SolarWorld.131 In that case, Commerce concluded that 
because the solar cells can be manufactured in China but assembled 
elsewhere, or manufactured elsewhere but assembled in China, it 
should apply the substantial transformation test to assess the imports’ 
origin.132 Its conclusion was based upon the determination that the 
component giving origin was the solar cell, not the assembly of the 
solar panels.133 A similar case involving imports from Taiwan resulted 
in the same finding.134 
However, in a second investigation of those cells, SolarWorld alleged 
that China circumvented its duties by assembling panels using only 
non-Chinese cells.135 During the investigation, Commerce accordingly 
chose to depart from the substantial transformation test and instead 
applied the “country of assembly test.”136 Commerce justified its 
departure from the standard test of origin for the following reasons: (1) 
the solar panel industry is unique because of its adaptable supply chain, 
thus allowing trade to easily shift in the fact of an AD/CVD order; (2) the 
scope language of the first AD/CVD order is neither administrable nor 
enforceable; and (3) Commerce needed a workable mechanism to 
determine injury in lieu of the substantial transformation test.137 
Petitioners in the original antidumping order case, SunPower Corp. v. 
United States,138 contended that Commerce’s new test of origin “was 
inconsistent with the agency’s prior practice for determining country 
of origin in similar proceedings, and departed from that practice 
without sufficient explanation.”139 The CIT agreed with the petitioners 
and found that Commerce departed from its prior practice without 
providing an ample justification for doing so.140 On remand, 
Commerce stated that it has broad discretion to apply the test it 
believes is most appropriate in an investigation.141 Commerce also 
 
 131. Id. at 912, 914; see also Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not 
Assembled into Modules, from the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 73,018 (Dec. 7, 2012). 
 132. SunPower Corp. v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1279 n.3 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017). 
 133. Id. at 1278–79, 1279 n.3. 
 134. Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from Taiwan: Antidumping 
Duty Order, 80 Fed. Reg. 8596, 8596 (Feb. 18, 2015). 
 135. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 914–15. 
 136. Id. at 915. 
 137. Id. (citing SunPower, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 1283). 
 138. 179 F. Supp. 3d 1286 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). 
 139. SunPower, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 1283. 
 140. SunPower, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1288–89. 
 141. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 915–16. 
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stated that the products at issue were distinct, since every investigation 
creates a new class of products.142 Finally, Commerce explained that it 
needed a test that would consider the role of China, which had 
allegedly been evading prior investigations and undermining the basis 
for AD/CVD duties.143 
The CIT upheld Commerce’s second determination and found its 
justification reasonable.144 Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit. On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit reiterated the deference it provides to 
Commerce in its interpretation of the Tariff Act, which did not specify how 
Commerce determines the class of goods to be investigated.145 In addition, 
this authority encompasses Commerce’s ability to determine country of 
origin.146 The only caveat is that Commerce must justify its reasoning if it 
decides to shift from one standard to another, as it did here.147 
The Federal Circuit reviewed Commerce’s justification for departing 
from its previous policy to practice to another using the arbitrary or 
capricious standard, which asks whether the explanation of Commerce 
reflects reasoned decision making.148 “[A]n explanation is reasoned if 
Commerce demonstrates that ‘the new policy is permissible under the 
statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes 
it to be better.’”149 Here, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that 
Commerce made a reasonable decision to depart from the prior 
practice of substantial transformation in this case and that it had 
adequate reason to do so.150 
C.   Procedures for and Exceptions to AD/CVD Orders 
A significant and controversial element to the AD/CVD 
investigation process is the determination that an exporting country is 
a nonmarket economy (“NME”). If Commerce determines that the 
exporting country is indeed an NME, the calculation of the dumping 
margin changes on the assumption that the sales price in that 
 
 142. Id. at 916. 
 143. Id. 
 144. SunPower, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 1288. 
 145. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 917; see also SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 
1022, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (allowing agencies to interpret their authority when a 
statute, such as in this case, is silent on the matter). 
 146. Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 917 (citing Bell Supply Co. v. United States, 888 
F.3d 1222, 1228–29 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
 147. Id. at 917 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 918 (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). 
 150. Id. at 920. 
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exporting country would not reflect the fair market value.151 
Accordingly, Commerce and the USITC turn to a market economy at 
a similar level of economic development, and they rely upon the 
“factors of production” used in making a comparable product in that 
country.152 Commerce must value the factors of production “to the 
extent possible . . . in one or more market economy countries that 
are—(A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the 
nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of 
comparable merchandise.”153 The resulting value is known as the 
“surrogate value” of the goods.154 
Upon determining that dumping has or will occur, Commerce is 
instructed to publish an antidumping duty order that directs CBP to 
collect the duty for the imports subject to the investigation.155 The order 
remains in place indefinitely; however, due to a change in law following 
passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act156 in 1995, Commerce 
and the USITC are required to conduct antidumping duty administrative 
reviews every five years to determine whether the order should be 
modified or eliminated.157 These are known as “sunset reviews.”158 
In addition to the sunset reviews, Commerce and the USITC are 
required to conduct annual administrative reviews of orders upon 
request by interested parties.159 
Lastly, Commerce and the USITC are required to conduct an 
administrative review when a petitioner claims to be a “new shipper” 
that was not exporting the subject goods at the time of the original 
dumping investigation.160 In these cases, Commerce is required to 
determine an individual weighted average for each of the known 
 
 151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2012). 
 152. § 1677b(c)(1). 
 153. § 1677b(c)(4). 
 154. See, e.g., Jacobi Carbons AB v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1352 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2018) (“When an antidumping duty proceeding involves a nonmarket economy 
country, Commerce determines normal value by valuing the factors of production in a 
surrogate country . . . and those values are referred to as ‘surrogate values.’”). 
 155. § 1673e(a). 
 156. § 3511. 
 157. § 1675(c). 
 158. 19 C.F.R. § 351.218 (2019). 
 159. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1). 
 160. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(i); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.214(a) (2019). 
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exporters of the subject merchandise.161 This is a process that has been 
subject to abuse in the past.162 
The calculation of dumping margins for exporters in NMEs and 
exceptions for new shippers appeared in Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food 
Co. v. United States (China Kingdom).163 In that case, Commerce 
conducted an administrative review of a dumping order that had been 
in effect since 1997 on exports of crawfish tail meat from China.164 The 
2014 review utilized data from the two largest exporters, China 
Kingdom and Deyan, while Ocean Flavor joined as a voluntary 
participant.165 Additionally, Commerce combined this administrative 
review with new shipper reviews for three companies, including 
Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. (Hongda).166 
Given that China was treated as an NME in this review, Commerce 
selected six countries that it believed would be adequate surrogate 
countries—South Africa, Colombia, Bulgaria, Thailand, Ecuador and 
Indonesia.167 Following Commerce’s “regulatory preference” to value 
factors of production from a single country, Commerce chose to use only 
Thailand as the surrogate for China.168 The factors of production that 
Commerce evaluated were: (1) manufacturing overhead; (2) selling, 
general, and administrative expenses; and (3) profit as determined by 
reviewing nonproprietary information on financial statements.169 
Relying on data from two Thai companies, Commerce determined 
that the weighted average dumping margin for each of the Chinese 
exporters was 0.0%.170 However, when Commerce issued its final report 
 
 161. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f–1(c)(1). 
 162. See generally Kevin J. Fandl, Promoting International Business Development While 
Protecting Domestic Markets: An Analysis of the New Shipper Review Policy of the United States, 
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 605, 606, 614–18 (2005). 
 163. Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States (China Kingdom) 917 F.3d 
1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 164. Id.; see also Notice of Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less Than 
Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the 
People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,218, 48,219 (Sept. 15, 1997). 
 165. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 
79 Fed. Reg. 64,565, 64,567–68 (Oct. 30, 2014). 
 166. See Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China: Initiation 
of Antidumping New Shipper Reviews, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,749, 64,749 (Oct. 31, 2014). 
 167. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1359. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.; see also Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China: 
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper 
Returns, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,624, 60,625 (Oct. 7, 2015). 
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shortly thereafter, the Thai financial statements were eliminated in 
favor of financial statements from the South African company, Oceana 
Group.171 Commerce contended that the Thai exporters had benefited 
from government subsidies, making their financial statements no 
longer valid for comparison.172 The new calculation led to dumping 
margins of 22.16% for China Kingdom, 12.04% for Deyan and 17.23% 
for Ocean Flavor.173 
The CIT agreed with Commerce’s findings and decision to rely on a 
second surrogate country after determining that some of the data from 
the first surrogate had become potentially inaccurate.174 The exporter 
appealed to the Federal Circuit and argued that Commerce incorrectly 
disregarded the financial reports from the Thai producers.175 
Conversely, the Crawfish Processors Alliance, a domestic interested 
party, argued that the CIT lacked jurisdiction to hear the case in the 
first instance. The Crawfish Processor Alliance contended that the 
foreign exporters failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 
because they failed to raise the objection to the Oceana financial 
statements during the administrative review.176 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis in the China Kingdom case yields two 
valuable takeaways. First, it states that exhaustion of remedies by a 
petitioner is not required in the absence of a statute mandating such 
exhaustion.177 A petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies “where 
Congress imposes an exhaustion requirement by statute.”178 “But where 
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion 
governs.”179 The Court clarified that the exhaustion requirement is not 
jurisdictional, meaning that failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
does not necessarily cause a lack of jurisdiction.180 
 
 171. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1360. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the People’s Republic of China: Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper Returns, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 21,840, 21,841 (Apr. 13, 2016). 
 174. Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 3d. 1279, 
1292–93 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017), aff’d, 917 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 175. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1361. 
 176. Id. at 1361–62. 
 177. Id. at 1363. 
 178. Id. (quoting Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 
561, 579 (1989)). 
 179. Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). 
 180. Id. (“We clarify that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies under 
§ 2637(d) is not jurisdictional.”). 
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Second, the Court concluded that Commerce did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting the Thai financial statements in favor of the 
South Africa equivalents.181 The Federal Circuit reiterated that 
Commerce has “broad discretion” in determining what constitutes the 
best available information for their administrative reviews.182 In this 
case, Commerce determined that the Thai companies were receiving 
export subsidies that affected their financial statements.183 The Trade 
Preferences Extension Act of 2015184 clearly states that, “[i]n valuing 
the factors of production,” Commerce “may disregard price or cost 
values without further investigation if [Commerce] has determined 
that broadly available export subsidies existed or particular instances 
of subsidization occurred.”185 Given the substantial evidence that the 
Thai companies received subsidies under Thailand’s Investment 
Promotion Act, the Court concluded that Commerce acted reasonably 
in disregarding those statements.186 
Another avenue that parties have to seek relief from an AD/CVD order 
is through a “scope ruling.” A scope ruling is a petition to Commerce to 
determine whether a particular good should be covered under an existing 
AD/CVD order or whether it can be excluded.187 Commerce is authorized 
to determine “whether a particular type of merchandise is within the class 
or kind of merchandise described in an existing finding of dumping or 
antidumping or countervailing duty order.”188 
The procedure adopted for scope rulings has been published as a 
regulation.189 An “interested party” initiates the investigation by 
petitioning the Secretary of Commerce (the “Secretary”) and 
presenting its case for why a given product should be excluded from 
an existing AD/CVD order.190 The Secretary is required to issue a 
ruling within forty-five days of receipt.191 In complex cases, the 
Secretary may issue a preliminary ruling, conduct a more thorough 
investigation, and then issue a final ruling.192 
 
 181. Id. at 1364–65. 
 182. Id. (quoting QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 183. Id. at 1365. 
 184. Pub. L. No. 114-27, §§ 501–507, 129 Stat. 362, 383–87 (2015). 
 185. § 505(b) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)). 
 186. China Kingdom, 917 F.3d at 1365–66. 
 187. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c) (2019). 
 188. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2012). 
 189. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225. 
 190. § 351.225(c)(1). 
 191. See § 351.225(c)(2). 
 192. § 351.225(d)–(e). 
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The Federal Circuit addressed one such scope ruling in the 2019 
term, dealing with the case of “curtain wall units.”193 That case 
originated with AD and CVD orders issued against aluminum extrusions 
from the People’s Republic of China.194 Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum 
Industry petitioned Commerce in 2013 to argue that the order does not 
cover curtain wall units when imported under a contract for an entire 
curtain wall.195 Applying its broad statutory discretion in scope 
determinations, Commerce concluded that the subject merchandise 
was not excluded from the AD/CVD orders.196 The CIT upheld 
Commerce’s conclusion and the Federal Circuit agreed.197 
Scope rulings are useful when it is unclear whether an imported 
good falls within the language of an AD/CVD Order; however, because 
petitions for scope rulings are presented to Commerce, CBP lacks the 
authority to interpret ambiguous language in an AD/CVD Order. This 
was clarified this term in Sunpreme Inc. v. United States.198 On January 7, 
2020, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc to 
again address the scope of CBP’s authority and whether such a 
“suspension may be continued following a scope inquiry by 
Commerce.”199 The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its findings that 
Commerce’s conclusion was valid.200 
The AD/CVD Order (the “Order”) in question in this case involved 
imported solar panels from China. The Order affected imported solar 
modules utilizing crystalline silicon photovoltaic (CSPV) cells.201 The 
Order excluded certain “thin film photovoltaic products.”202 After the 
 
 193. See Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 918 F.3d 
1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 194. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping 
Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30,650 (May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from 
the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653, 
30,653 (May 26, 2011). 
 195. Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co., 918 F.3d at 1357–58. 
 196. Id. at 1358. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d 1198, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2019), vacated en banc, 946 
F.3d 1300 (2020). 
 199. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 946 F.3d 1300, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
 200. Id. at 1322. 
 201. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into 
Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 73,017, 73,017 (Dec. 7, 2012); Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or 
Not Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 73,018, 73,018 (Dec. 7, 2012). 
 202. Sunpreme II CAFC, 924 F.3d at 1201. 
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Order was published in 2012, Sunpreme imported its solar modules 
under the entry type “01,” which indicated that it was not subject to the 
Order.203 CBP did not object to this entry type until 2015, when CBP 
sua sponte determined that the imported solar modules were in fact 
subject to the Order and would thus be subject to a cash bond and a 
suspension of liquidation.204 
CBP was uncertain about the language in the Order, so it reached 
out to Commerce to clarify the language in June 2015. Commerce 
responded by informing CBP that the proper mechanism to determine 
whether a good falls within an AD/CVD Order is for the importer to 
file a request for a scope review.205 Sunpreme challenged CBP’s 
determination at the CIT, and the CIT explained that the language in 
the Order regarding what “thin film” means is ambiguous, but that it 
is not within the authority of CBP to interpret that language.206 The 
Federal Circuit reversed that decision on the grounds that the CIT 
lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct challenge from CBP when another 
administrative remedy—namely, a scope ruling—was available.207 
Sunpreme went back to Commerce in 2015 to request a scope ruling, 
which Commerce initiated in December 2015.208 In conducting a scope 
ruling that requires interpretation of ambiguous language, Commerce 
follows two sets of sources: the first set of sources includes the scope 
language contained in the order itself, “[t]he descriptions contained 
in the petition, the initial investigation, and the determinations of the 
Secretary [of Commerce] (including prior scope determinations) and 
the [ITC].”209 These are called the “(k)(1)” sources.210 If those sources 
do not address the ambiguity in question, Commerce turns to the 
(k)(2) sources, which include “the product’s physical characteristics, 
ultimate purchasers’ expectations, the ultimate use of the product, 
trade channels in which the product is sold, and the manner in which 
the product is advertised and displayed.”211 
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In this case, Commerce relied on the (k)(2) sources to conclude that 
the Sunpreme solar modules, which were not clearly included but also 
not clearly excluded from the AD/CVD Order, were in fact covered by 
that Order.212 It found that the mere presence of thin film did not exclude 
the modules from the Order, and that they functioned as other CSPV 
modules, which were subject to the Order.213 Commerce instructed CBP 
to continue suspending liquidation of the imported goods.214 
Upon challenge by Sunpreme, the CIT concluded that Commerce 
made a reasonable determination regarding the inclusion of the 
imported solar modules within the AD/CVD Order.215 However, the CIT 
also concluded that Commerce inappropriately ordered CBP to continue 
suspending liquidation because that original suspension was ultra vires.216 
Commerce only has the authority to continue a lawful suspension.217 
The Federal Circuit, in upholding the CIT decision on both counts, 
made very clear that the roles of Commerce and CBP in AD/CVD 
investigations and determinations are quite distinct. While Commerce 
has the authority to interpret, through scope rulings, whether certain 
goods fall within its own orders, CBP has merely “ministerial duties” to 
apply the determinations made by Commerce.218 “We also recognized 
the superior institutional competence of Commerce over Customs for 
antidumping and countervailing duty matters in Mitsubishi Electronics, 
noting Customs’ merely ministerial duties, and holding that “Customs 
cannot ‘modify . . . [Commerce’s] determinations, their underlying 
facts, or their enforcement.’”219 The Federal Circuit further reasoned 
that Commerce may only suspend liquidation of entries after a scope 
inquiry has concluded, “and thus “retroactive authorization of 
suspension of liquidation is prohibited.”220 
It should be noted that this decision included extensive analysis by 
the majority as well as a strong dissent regarding the cross-appeal by 
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the United States over the continuation of suspension of liquidation.221 
The dissent agreed with the majority that CBP has only ministerial 
duties whereas it is up to Commerce to interpret the Orders that it 
issues.222 However, Judge Prost suggested that CBP has the authority to 
examine imports and apply Orders as appropriate based upon their 
own findings of fact,223 an interpretation that the Federal Circuit 
dispelled in its recent en banc opinion.224 The dissenting opinion 
continued to suggest that the majority opinion would incentivize 
importers not to request scope inquiries where CBP is failing to apply 
AD/CVD Orders to their goods.225 
There are, of course, a multitude of ways in which an antidumping 
order can be modified, such as through the five-year sunset review 
process, a petition from an importer, or an order from the CIT. In the 
case of BMW of North America LLC v. United States,226 which discussed 
importing ball bearings from the United Kingdom, Commerce and the 
CIT bounced back and forth over the need to maintain the Order 
during the sunset review, ultimately terminating the Order, and then 
reinstating it.227 This unusual process left BMW in the unfortunate 
position of uncertainty over whether it was subject to an Order 
affecting its imports. 
The BMW case began with a May 2011 request for administrative 
reviews of a 1989 AD/CVD Order on ball bearing imports from France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, posted by 
Commerce.228 BMW timely submitted a request for review.229 At the 
same time, the same Order was undergoing a five-year sunset review.230 
The sunset review resulted in the ITC finding a continuation of 
material injury to a domestic industry and thus maintaining a domestic 
injury. The CIT, however, vacated and remanded that decision several 
times between 2006 and 2011, ultimately leading the ITC to determine 
that there would likely not be a material injury if the Order were 
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discontinued.231 Commerce published notice in the Federal Register 
of the termination of the AD Order and notified parties with pending 
administrative reviews that those reviews would be “discontinue[d].”232 
The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision that led to the 
termination of the Order in 2013 and, thus, reinstated the Order.233 
Accordingly, Commerce electronically notified all of the parties that 
had previously submitted administrative review requests and asked 
them to submit a quantity and value questionnaire to determine the 
most applicable and appropriate dumping margin.234 BMW did not 
respond, arguing later that the time lapse and confusion over the 
existence of the Order left it unaware that it was required to respond.235 
Ultimately, Commerce applied an adverse facts available rate, which is 
utilized when an importer subject to an administrative review fails to 
respond to a request for information. The failure to respond led 
Commerce to determine a rate on its own, which tends to be a higher 
rate than would otherwise have been applied. 
D.   Liquidation of Entries 
The CBP’s final act in settling its accounts for imports subject to 
antidumping or countervailing duty orders is liquidation, whereby the 
final rate that has been established is applied to the entries and 
charged to the importer.236 Assuming no adjustments are made along 
the way, liquidation usually happens at the estimated duty amount that 
the importer initially paid to receive their goods.237 
However, when goods are subject to an antidumping or countervailing 
duty order, or otherwise stuck in litigation, liquidation often takes place 
long after the goods arrive at the port of entry.238 While these legal 
challenges work their way up and down the courts, the goods are released 
to the importer, who pays estimated duties on those goods.239 If the 
liquidated amount is higher than the estimated duties, the importer is 
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billed for the difference. Likewise, if the liquidated amount is lower, 
the importer will receive a refund of duties paid. 
While undergoing an AD/CVD investigation, if Commerce or a 
court decides to adjust the duty rate under an existing AD/CVD order, 
they are required by law to issue a Timken240 notice, alerting the party 
that the duty rate will change.241 That notice must be issued within ten 
days of a court decision to change the duty amount.242 The new duty 
may not be applied retroactively; however, all entries of goods after the 
date of the Timken notice are subject to the new duty rate. 
The case of Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States243 challenged some 
aspects of these notices.244 This case addressed an antidumping duty 
order on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells imported from China.245 
Note that a parallel case, relevant here, addressed countervailing duties 
on these same imports.246 In Commerce’s 2012 final antidumping 
determination for these imports, it established a China-wide rate of 
249.96%, but gave Sumecht, d/b/a Sumec, a separate rate of 24.48%, 
which was later lowered to 13.18% due to a World Trade Organization 
decision.247 Commerce’s determination was challenged and, following a 
voluntary remand, Commerce decided that Sumec no longer qualified for 
a separate rate due to a concern for consistency with recent rulings.248 
As noted above, any time the courts decide to change an existing 
duty rate, Commerce must issue a Timken notice to make the parties 
aware of the change. This notice must be issued within ten days of that 
court decision. In this case, Commerce issued their notice forty-nine 
days after the CIT’s decision in Jiangsu Jiasheng,249 which mandated the 
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redetermination of the rate for Sumec.250 Commerce retroactively 
dated that notice with the date of October 15, 2015, and instructed 
CBP to begin liquidating entries for the period October 15 through 
November 23, 2015. Sumec challenged that decision on the grounds 
that the Timken notice had not been properly issued.251 
Sumec sought a preliminary injunction to prevent CBP from 
liquidating entries for the subject period at the higher duty rate. A 
court will grant a preliminary injunction if the movant can show “(1) 
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent 
immediate relief, (3) the balance of interests weighing in favor of relief, 
and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest.”252 The CIT 
previously denied Sumec’s motion on the ground that it had not shown 
the likelihood of irreparable harm since the liquidation had already 
been enjoined in the parallel countervailing duty case.253 The Federal 
Circuit agreed and found no reason to depart from this decision.254 
It should be noted that, subsequent to this decision, the case 
returned to the CIT for a hearing on the merits of the improper Timken 
notice.255 In that case, Judge Choe-Groves opined that Commerce is 
required to issue the Timken notice within ten days of the court 
decision adjusting duty rates; that Commerce may not remedy a late 
notice by making such notice retroactive; and that Commerce 
retroactively increasing the duty amount is not harmless error.256 While 
that decision is likely to be appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals, it would appear as of the time of this writing that Commerce may 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A significant number of trade cases at the Federal Circuit this year 
involved classification issues. And of those, several revolved around the 
proper definition of the good, from door knobs to passenger vans. The 
Federal Circuit emphasized, once again, the difference between eo 
nomine and use definitions of objects. The former refers to a 
commonly understood object—such as a wrench—that is defined by 
its name rather than its intended use. A “use” definition, on the other 
hand, is best understood as an object that is defined by how it is 
intended to be used. The difference was highlighted by two cases this 
term: Irwin, which classified wrenches and pliers as eo nomine regardless 
of their final intended use.257 On the other hand, in the Ford case, the 
Federal Circuit found that when use is implied in a common term, such 
as cargo van, that use should be examined when classifying the good.258 
In the dumping arena, a variety of issues were covered this year, from 
the proper determination of country of origin and Commerce’s 
discretion in making that determination259 to the ability of Commerce 
to reinstate an AD/CVD order that it had discontinued.260 One of the 
key cases in this area this year was the China Kingdom case, which 
involved the selection of a surrogate country to assess financial 
statements in a case involving a nonmarket economy.261 In that case, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that Commerce had broad discretion to 
choose where to source its information in dumping determinations 
involving nonmarket economies.262 
The forthcoming term at the Federal Circuit will likely be even more 
contentious as the court tackles an appeal over the use of section 232 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to block the entry of steel and 
aluminum imports under the auspice of national security.263 This 
important case questions the ability of Congress to delegate its trade 
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powers to the President and whether doing so violates the 
nondelegation doctrine. The CIT upheld the authority of Congress to 
make such a delegation on the basis of precedent established by the 
1976 Algonquin case.264 However, the judges in the CIT decision 
questioned the validity of that precedent given the current application 
of section 232 tariffs.265 It will be up to the Federal Circuit to determine 
the validity of that delegation, and it will likely do so during the 2019 
to 2020 term. Stay tuned. 
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